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COMMENTS
COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF TAVERN OWNERS
Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971)
Defendant Sager owned and operated a tavern in San Bernadino
County, California. Sager knew that O'Connell, a customer, was be-
coming heavily intoxicated, yet he continued serving him drinks. This
violated the California Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.1 Sager knew the
only access to the tavern was a narrow, winding, mountain road. When
O'Connell drove his vehicle down the road, he crossed into the opposite
lane of traffic and struck plaintiff's vehicle. Sager demurred to the com-
plaint on the ground that the seller of alcoholic beverages is not liable
for injuries resulting from the buyer's intoxication. The demurrer was
sustained without leave to amend. The Supreme Court of California
reversed, and held: that the seller of alcoholic beverages owes the general
public a duty to protect it from "injuries to person and damage to
property from the excessive use of intoxicating liquor."
2
The common law did not impose liability on a tavern owner for
furnishing alcoholic beverages to a customer who as a result of his
intoxication either injured himself or a third person.3 The consumption,
not the sale, was the proximate cause of injury.4 The courts have created
exceptions to this rule. A tavern owner is liable for the death or injury
of a customer who was induced to drink when his mental faculties were
completely impaired by intoxication.5 An innkeeper or restaurant owner
had to protect his guests from injury caused by other guests., In spite of
the exceptions, the rule had harsh consequences; therefore, many states
1. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1954) provides:
Sales to habitual drunkards. Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold,
furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverages to any habitual or common drunkard or
to any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor.
2. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153, 165, 486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 631 (1971).
3. Cruse v. Aden, 127 111. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Tarwater v. Atlantic Co., 176 Tenn. 510, 144
S.W.2d 746 (1940). See also H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS REGULATING THE MANUFAC-
TURE AND SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS § 281 (1892).
4. King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505 (1886); Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967);
Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966).
5. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940); Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Ore. 92, 35 P.2d 672
(1934); Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940); McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (1883).
6. Reilly v. 180 Club, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 420, 82 A.2d 210 (1951); Peck v. Gerber, 154 Ore.
126, 59 P.2d 675 (1936). Cf. Mastad v. Swedish Brethren, 83 Minn. 40, 85 N.W. 913 (1901). The
basis for relief in this situation is independent and not related to the common law exceptions
imposing liability on tavern owners. Its origin is the duty of the owner to protect his business
invitees. See also Windorski v. Doyle, 219 Minn. 402, 18 N.W.2d 142 (1945).
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tried to ease the burden of the common law by passing Dram Shop or
Civil Damages Acts. 7
In states without Dram Shop Acts, the courts have looked to the
universal prohibitions against liquor sales to minors and intoxicated
persons as a basis for liability.' Courts have refused to rely on these
statutes for several reasons: the statute is either penal or regulatory,9 the
sale is not the proximate cause of injury, 10 or interference by the courts
would constitute judicial legislation of Dram Shop Acts." Courts using
these statutes to create liability have attached various meanings to a
violation. The statute may create a duty to the injured parties." A viola-
tion of the statute may be evidence of negligence 3 or negligence per se. 14
California has no Dram Shop Act and has consistently denied any
kind of recovery from the liquor vendor. 15 The courts refused to apply
§ 25602 of the Business and Professions Code to constitute negligence
per sell and considered it irrelevant because the consumption, not the
sale, of alcoholic beverages was the proximate cause of any subsequent
injury. 7 Moreover, it is argued the judiciary should not intervene so long
as the state legislature's silence was an affirmation of existing policy. 8
In order to reverse its ground and impose liability on the tavern owner,.
the California Supreme Court in Vesely had to alter the basic theory
7. States having Dram Shop Acts are listed in Comment, Dram Shop Liability-A Judicial
Response, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 995, 996-97 n.6 (1969).
8. States having these prohibitory statutes are listed in Note, Common Law Liability of the
Liquor Vendor, 18 W. Ras. L. Rav. 251, 262-63 nn. 58 & 59 (1966).
9. Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945); Hull v. Rund, 150 Colo. 425, 374 P.2d
351 (1962); Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969); Hamm v. Carson City Nugget,
Inc., 85 Nev. 99,450 P.2d 358, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 860 (1969).
10. Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358,
92 N.W.2d 682 (1958); Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591,417 P.2d 71 (1966).
11. Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982,
183 So. 2d 328 (1966); State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951).
12. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
903 (1960); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc.2d
381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
13. Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Ramsey v. Anctil, 106
N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
14. Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So.
2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
15. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Lammers v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co.,
186 Cal. 379, 199 P. 523 (1921) (dictum); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530
(1949); Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943).
16. Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943).
17. Id., accord, Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949).
18. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955). The argument was strengthened because
the legislature had made other changes in statutes governing the sale and use of intoxicating liquors.
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underlying liability."9 The violation of § 25602 was the mechanism for
this change. A nonliability statute may define a duty20 if the statute
19. Recently, the state's appellate courts have expressed discontent with the California position.
In Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal. App. 2d 687, 58 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1967), a case denying
the liability of a service station owner for the sale of gasoline to an intoxicated motorist, the court
could not differentiate between the cases in which a dangerous instrumentality such as an automo-
bile was entrusted to an intoxicated or incompetent person and the case of the tavern owner who
served liquor to an intoxicated person knowing that the intoxicated person would go out and drive
an automobile. For California cases holding the entrustor of a dangerous instrument to an intoxi-
cated or incompetent person liable to a 3rd party see, e.g., Johnson v. Casetta, 197 Cal. App. 2d
272, 17 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1961) (incompetent, inexperienced driver); Knight v. Gosselin, 124 Cal. App.
2d 290, 12 P.2d 454 (1932) (automobile entrusted to an intoxicated person). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) Or TORTS § 390 (1965). The results were conflicting, the incongruity based chiefly on
historical grounds. Refusal to extend liability in the latter set of circumstances, the court said,
constituted a "back-eddy running counter to the mainstream of modern tort doctrine," but its
hands were tied by stare decisis, 250 Cal. App. 2d 687, 691, 58 Cal. Rptr, 792, 794 (1967). The
court held that the recent line of cases favoring the creation of tavern owner liability to be the better
rule. It was in this sense that the California position was anachronistic. See Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Deeds v. United
States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Prevatt v. McClennan, 201 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Colligan v. Cousar, 38 II1. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963); Elder v. Fisher, 247
Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Adamian v. Three
Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1
(1959); Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc.2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Jardine v. Upper
Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App.
656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1965); cf. Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Ramsey v.
Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965). Recent decisions, however, have not all favored the
extension of liability. The contrary position is also well-represented. Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889,
385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Hull v. Rund, 150 Colo. 425, 374 P.2d 351 (1962); Meade v. Freeman, 93
Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958); Lee v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966); Hall v. Budagher Bar, 76 N.M. 591, 417,
P.2d 71 (1966); Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969); Garcia v.
Hargrove, 46 Wis.2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1966); ef. Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d
383 (1967).
In Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1968), a minor
became intoxicated at his employer's Christmas party. The employer, aware that the youth was
intoxicated, nevertheless helped the minor to his automobile so that he could drive home. The court
held an action would lie against the employer under these circumstances. The relationship went
beyond the mere furnishing of alcoholic beverages. The employer's affirmative conduct, leading the
minor to his car, made him liable to other pedestrians and drivers.
20. The court had to face the problem whether or not it would defer to the legislature. In Cole
v. Rush 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955), the court held that this change in civil liability would
have to come from the legislature. The recent trend in other jurisdictions, however, has weakened
this argument. See cases cited in note 19 supra. The existence of other judicially-made changes in
tort liability tends to diminish the persuasiveness of a policy of restraint. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d
914. 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (liability of parent to child for negligence); Muskopf
v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (liability of hospital
district for the negligence of employees). The court, also, reasoned that the legislature had recog-
nized the right to intervene here by passing § 25602 of the Business and Professions Code
and § 669 of the Evidence Code, text quoted in note 25 infra. in the light of Cole this argument is
much less persuasive. Section 26502 was already on record and the presumption codified in § 669
was recognized judicially.
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protects a class of persons which includes the plaintiff.21 Other jurisdic-
tions have used statutes similar to § 25602 to reach a similar result.22
These statutes were enacted to protect the general public from injuries
caused by intoxication.23 In California, a violation of the statute creates
a rebuttable presumption of negligence. The plaintiff must show that a
public statute, regulation, or ordinance was violated; the violation
caused injury or death; the harm resulted from an occurence which the
statute, regulation, or ordinance was designed to prevent; and the person
injured or killed was in the class of persons for whose sake the statute,
regulation, or ordinance was adopted.24
21. The court relied on Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal.2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954) (municipal
ordinance making it illegal to leave keys in locked automobile), and Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal.2d
488, 127 P.2d 1 (1942) (statute requiring accurate tax assessment). In neither case did the California
court find the defendant liable.
22. E.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 903 (1960); Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Davis v. Shiappa-
cossee, 155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Rappaport
v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
23. The purposes of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act are stated in CAL. Bus. & PROIF.
CODE § 23001 (West 1954) which provides:
Exercise of Police Powers; Purposes, Liberal Construction:
This division is an exercise of the police powers of the State for the protection of the
safety, welfare, health, peace, and morals of the people of the State, to eliminate the
evils of unlicensed and unlawful manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic
beverages, and to promote temperance in the use and consumption of alcoholic
beverages. It is hereby declared that the subject matter of this division involves in
the highest degree the economic, social, and moral well-being and the safety of the
State and all its people. All provisions of this division shall be liberally construed
for the accomplishment of these purposes.
24. Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal.2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958); Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474,
218 P.2d 531 (1950); Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal.2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947)
(concurring opinion by Justice Traynor favoring a negligence per se approach). This presumption
was codified by CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 (West Supp. 1971) which provides:
Failure to exercise due care: Violation of statute, ordinance, or regulation: Death or injury
to person or property: Rebuttal evidence
(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute,
ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or injury to his person or property was one of
the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was
adopted.
(b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that:
(1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did what might rea-
sonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circum-
stances, who desired to comply with the law; or
(2) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation was a child and exer-
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In tavern-owner liability cases, proximate cause was a question of law
and determinative of the outcome of the action.2 Now, duty is the
relevant question of law. A California appellate court opinion gives a
good description of recent developments:
Current judicial analysis considers the outer boundaries of negligence
in terms of duty of care rather than proximate causation. The imposition
of a duty of care and its extension to the expectable conduct of third
persons is largely a question of law for the court. Where existence of a
duty is brought into question, its affirmation rests in part upon social
policy factors, in part upon an inquiry whether the actor's conduct in-
volves a foreseeable risk to persons in the plaintiff's situation. 21
Causation is thus a question of fact. The defendant's conduct must
contribute substantially to the plaintiff's injury and outside forces may
not intervene sufficiently to absolve the defendant. The old common law
cases involving tavern owners show the importance of intervening forces.
The balance has shifted. The consumption of alcoholic beverages, being
a break in the chain of causation from sale to injury, does not necessarily
relieve the defendant from liability. He is still liable so long as his
conduct is a substantial factor in causing the injury and the intervening
act of a third party was reasonably foreseeable at the time the negligent
act occurred. The questions of substantial contribution to the plaintiff's
cised the degree of care ordinarily exercised by persons of his maturity, intelligence,
and capacity under similar circumstances, but the presumption may not be rebutted
by such proof if the violation occurred in the course of an activity normally engaged
in only by adults and requiring adult qualifications.
For the position of other states regarding the impact of a violation refer to the cases cited in notes
12, 13, and 14supra.
25. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246,
210 P.2d 530 (1949); Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943). For a detailed
analysis of the many meanings of proximate cause in California see W. Prosser, Proximate Cause
in California, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 369 (1950).
26. Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal. App. 2d 687, 691, 58 Cal. Rptr. 792, 794 (1967).
For an overview of the various social policy questions a court may consider in imposing a duty see
L. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928) and-The Duty
Problem in Negligence Cases: H, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255 (1929).
27. Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal.2d 857, 362 P.2d 345, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1961); Austin v. Riverside
Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal.2d 225, 282 P.2d 69 (1955); Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal.2d 399, 240 P.2d
575 (1952); McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal.2d 295, 195 P.2d 783 (1948); Stasulat v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 8 Cal.2d 631, 67 P.2d 678 (1937); Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., 250
Cal. App. 2d 687, 58 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1967); Ewart v. Southern California Gas. Co., 237 Cal.
App.2d 163, 46 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1965). These cases show the general approval of RESTATEIENT OF
TORTS §§ 442 through 453 (1934) which deal with superseding and intervening causes. Especially
relevant here is § 447 which considers "Negligence of Intervening Acts." See also § 449.
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injury and foreseeability of the harm are for the jury to determine. 21
The policy adopted by the court reflects the growing concern for the
danger caused by the drunken driver on the highways.2" That people rely
on the automobile for transportation is a reasonable assumption. A
policy which could affect the highway casualty toll is welcome. The
effects may be only marginal since alcohol is easily obtained; but any
deterrent to the serving and furnishing of alcoholic beverages to potential
motorists should be helpful.30 Also, the conduct expected of a tavern
owner is no different from that expected of him prior to this decision.
Now he shares in making recompense for injuries for which he is respon-
sible. All this should be to the advantage of the plaintiff who, prior to
tavern owner liability, was limited to his defendant's financial resources
and insurance coverage. With the addition of another culpable party, a
better chance for complete recovery should follow.
The decision leaves two questions unanswered. First, the court refused
to decide whether it would extend liability to non-commercial furnish-
ers. 31 The language of § 25602 does not appear to preclude liability,32
but the administrative problems created if a cause of action would lie in
this situation could tend to discourage judicial action. A few jurisdic-
tions which have looked at this question have chosen to defer to the
legislative branch.33 Secondly, the court did not consider whether the
tavern owner would be liable for injuries suffered by the intoxicated
person. Several jurisdictions have allowed the injured intoxicated person
28. Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd., 67 Cal.2d 232, 430 P.2d 68, 60 Cal. Rtpr. 510 (1967);
McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal.2d 295, 195 P.2d 783 .(1948); Mosley v. Arden Farms
Co., 26 Cal.2d 213, 157 P.2d 372 (1945); Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal. App.2d 687,
58 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1967). See Stewart v. Cox 55 Cal.2d 857, 362 P.2d 345, 13 Cal. Rtpr. 521 (1961).
29. See DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 1968 ALCOHOL AND HIOHWAY SAFETY REPORT,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968).
30. In Vesely, the court's opinion is not so narrow to exclude liability resulting from activities
of an intoxicated person other than driving an automobile, but the major impact is in the highway
safety area.
31. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153, 157,486 P.2d 151, 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 625 (1971).
32. See text of § 25602, supra note I. The court also did not have to face whether a violation
of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (West 1954), making it a misdemeanor to sell alcoholic
beverages to minors, would give rise to a cause of action against the tavern owner. The similarity
to § 25602 and that both are within the purview of § 23001 makes liability in this case probable
too.
33. Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App.
219, 175 N.W.2d 303 (1970) (recovery only from bonded liquor sellers as defined by a statute),
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to recover, 34 but this creates another problem: the status of contributory
negligence as a defense. If the court would at a later date extend tavern
owner liability to the injured intoxicated person it would render the cause
of action meaningless if at the same time it allowed contributory negli-
gence as a defense. 35 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 483 allows con-
tributory negligence as a defense to the violation of a statute except for
statutes which place the entire responsibility for injuries on the defen-
dant.31 How the California court will interpret § 25602 is subject to
conjecture.
34. Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963) (wrongful death of intoxicated minor);
Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965). Davis which involved a minor is perhaps
distinguishable from Ramsey which involved an adult who, after he became intoxicated, began to
pound his fist on the table where he was sitting causing broken glass to become imbedded in his
hand. The interest of society in protecting minors may be sufficient to give rise to a cause of action
in the former case and not in the latter.
35. In Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955), one of the court's reasons for denying
liability was the plaintiff's negligent conduct, the excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages. To
this extent Cole and Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App.2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943) are not overruled
even though their value as precedent is greatly diminished.
36. Contributory negligence allowed as a defense: Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348
(1969) (assumption of risk also); Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965); McNally
v. Addis, 65 Misc.2d 204, 317 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (assumption of risk also); contra,
Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, 84 N.J. Super. 372, 202 A.2d 208 (1964). It may make some sense
to allow contributory negligence as a defense in the third party situation but not in the situation
where the intoxicated person is injured. In the former situation the injured party is supposedly
competent and able to avoid derelict conduct on his part. In the latter case, this is not true. The
intoxicated person no longer may be able to control his behavior. On the other hand, such a holding
could be construed as an undeserved windfall to the motorist who happened to get drunk.
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